The objective of this paper is to provide a comparative assessment of the consequences of worker displacement in France and the United-States. I estimate wage losses of displaced workers in the two countries and examine the relative contribution of two important sources of post-displacement wage adjustments. The first one relates to the loss of seniority-accumulated firmspecific earnings potential. The second one arises from match heterogeneity. Identification of the relative contribution of these two sources can be achieved given separate estimates of returns to seniority. I show that while the order of magnitude of total wage losses are comparable in the two economies (10 to 15%), the sources of wage adjustment differ strongly: all of the wage decline in France seems to be due to the loss of accumulated firm specific earning potential, while in the US, more than half of measured wage losses arise from a downgrading into lower quality job matches.
Introduction
The microeconomic consequences of worker displacement, defined as permanent job losses, independent of individual performance, and arising from industrial restructuring, plant closing and mass layoff, has recently received considerable attention.
While existing research have brought a detailed description of the US case, evidence on European countries is still relatively sparse. Furthermore, for both Europe and the US, the structural determinants of observed post-displacement outcomes remain largely unknown. The objective of this paper is to provide a comparative assessment of the extent and the determinants of post-displacement individual wage adjustments in France and the United-States.
From a descriptive point of view, numerous studies have analyzed, over the last decade, the impact of such worker dislocation on individual earnings in the United-States, and have provided strong evidence that the average US displaced worker suffer severe earnings losses, on the order of 10 to 25%. Furthermore, they have shown that these earnings losses not only arise from the occurrence of postdisplacement joblessness spells but also originate, to a large extent, from a persistent fall in individual wages, upon re-employment.
More recently, several papers have also investigated whether comparable postdisplacement wage adjustments were at work on presumably rigid European labor markets. Available evidence suggest that, on average, European displaced workers experience significant but possibly smaller wage losses than their US counterparts.
However, a strict comparison to US results is often hindered by cross-study differences in econometric specification and in the definition and measurement of worker displacement. Hence, whether worker displacement implies similar wage losses in Europe and the US largely remains an opened question. The first contribution of this paper is to address this question, by estimating wage losses of displaced worker using a single econometric framework and comparable longitudinal micro-data from the French Employment surveys and the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
Obviously, one should not a priori expect worker dislocation to induce similar wage losses in the two countries, since wage losses of displaced workers will result from several aspects of wage setting mechanisms that are likely to vary across countries. Unfortunately, in this respect, the structural determinants of observed wage adjustments have remained, to a large extent, unstudied. In fact, it is striking to notice that post-displacement wage losses have received very different interpretations on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United-States, worker displacement is often seen as the disruption of an on-going long term employment relationship and many papers tend to attribute observed wage losses to the loss of firm or industry seniority. In this view, post-displacement wage adjustment would result from the loss of accumulated firm-or industry-specific earnings potential originating from specific human capital accumulation or compensation deferral. On the contrary, the European commonsense usually stresses the role of job match heterogeneity in the explanation of post-displacement wage adjustment and the lack thereof. It sees post-displacement outcomes as the result of displaced workers job search strategy among heterogeneous jobs : according to this interpretation, observed wage losses would mostly reflect the extent to which displaced workers are willing (or able) to take on low paying jobs in order to return to employment, regardless of previous job seniority. While both accumulated firm-specific earnings potential and match heterogeneity are likely to contribute to post-displacement wage adjustments in Europe and the US, no systematic account of the contribution of each of these two determinants has been provided yet.
The second contribution of this paper is to empirically disentangle these two components and provide an analysis of the determinants of post-displacement wage adjustments. Beyond the descriptive comparison of wage losses in Europe and the US, identifying the sources of observed wage adjustment appears important for at least two reasons. First, from an analytical point of view, it may help to characterize the specificities of labor market dynamics and wage setting mechanisms at work in these different countries. Secondly, from a prescriptive point of view, it may also help determine what type of public policy, e.g. training or job search assistance, could best help alleviate the individual cost of worker displacement.
Previous research has already provided evidence that wage losses rise with predisplacement seniority. Yet, this descriptive result falls short of identifying the contribution of intra-firm wage-seniority dynamics to observed wage losses, since higher pre-displacement seniority can also be associated with higher pre-displacement match quality. Unlike previous research on worker displacement, this paper takes into account the endogeneity of pre-displacement seniority. It relies on separate estimates of the within-firm returns to seniority, in each country, to determine the contribution of seniority related firm-specific earnings potential to observed wage losses and allows to residually assess the contribution of match heterogeneity.
Two main results emerge from this analysis. Firstly, it appears that the wage losses experienced by French displaced workers amount to about 10-15%, a figure only slightly lower than wage losses estimated for displaced US workers. Secondly, I show that despite comparable order of magnitude, the underlying determinants of observed wage adjustments differ markedly in the two countries : in France, most of observed wage losses arises from the loss of seniority related firm-specific earnings potential while in the US wage losses are primarily explained by a downgrading of displaced workers into lower quality matches, beyond the loss of seniority related earnings components.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I analyze, from a theoretical perspective, the structural determinants of post-displacement wage adjustments and discuss related work from previous research. In section 3 I discuss the empirical estimation procedure and describe the data used in the empirical analysis.
Section 4 presents basic estimates of wage losses of displaced workers and section 5 examines the contribution of pre-displacement job seniority and match heterogeneity to estimated post-displacement wage adjustments.
Determinants of post-displacement wage losses : a theoretical discussion
The estimation of wage losses of displaced workers usually involves a comparison of post-displacement wage to either pre-displacement earnings or to a counterfactual of what individual earnings would have been in the absence of displacement. Consequently, understanding the impact of job displacement requires an analysis of both the pre-displacement wage structure and the post-displacement re-employment pro-cess. In this section, I lay out a simple model of labor market dynamics to analyze the determinants of post-displacement wage adjustments and discuss results from previous research.
A simple model of labor market dynamics and postdisplacement wage losses
Consider an economy where homogeneous workers can be either employed or unemployed. Unemployed workers receive job offers with probability λ 0 per period of time. The economy consists of two types of firms : high-wage firms paying entry wage level w H and low-wage firms paying entry wage level w L with w L < w H and let p denote the probability that the job offered be of the high-wage type, conditional on receiving a job offer. For now, wage heterogeneity can, indifferently, be seen as the result of either heterogeneity in match productivity or non-competitive rents.
For simplicity, let us assume that job termination is a deterministic event :
employed workers are exogenously displaced two periods after they entered the employment pool, regardless of previous employment history, and flow back into unem-
ployment.
1 Over the course of their employment spells, workers receive alternative job offers with probability λ 1 per period of time, and we assume that alternative offers are drawn from the same distribution as for unemployed workers. For workers staying with the same firm in period 2, assume that wage grows at a rate g per period of time. On-the-job wage growth is assumed to be firm-specific. Workers employed in high-wage firms will never change firm over the course of their employment spell. Workers employed at low-wage firms will change job when receiving a high-wage offer, as long as w H /w L > (1 + g) which will be assumed throughout the rest of this section.
In this setting, unemployed workers job search strategy consists of two options : either accept high wage offers only (denoted strategy I) or accept all job offers (denoted strategy II).
2 Strategy I trades a higher expected gain when exiting unemployed against a lower probability of finding a job. Depending on the value of the relevant structural parameters, this strategy may yield higher expected discounted pay-off than the alternative of accepting all types of offers. Higher unemployment benefits, a larger discrepancy between w L and w H , a higher value of λ 0 or a lower value of λ 1 will make this situation more likely to occur.
As a consequence, two equilibria may arise on the labor market. These two equilibria will differ not only in terms of unemployment dynamics but also in terms of inter-firm mobility and wage dispersion. The main characteristics of each equilibrium are summarized in table 1.
The case where unemployed workers are willing to accept all job offers exhibits low unemployment, high worker mobility both out of unemployment and between jobs and high equilibrium wage dispersion.
3 In this case, equilibrium cross-section wage dispersion arises from three factors. The first one is the initial dispersion in accepted wage offers. The second one is the opportunity for workers in low-wage 2 We rule out the possibility for unemployed workers to never accept any offer, assuming for instance that unemployment benefits are lower than w H . 3 Unemployment rates reported in table 1 derive from the usual flow equilibrium condition. Equilibrium unemployment rate is given by s/(s + h), where s and h denote the exit rate from employment and unemployment respectively. Under strategy L, h is equal to λ 0 . Furthermore, in this simplified model the equilibrium aggregate exit rate out of employment is 1/2. firms to move to high-wage firms at the end of their first period of employment. The third source of wage heterogeneity is on-the-job wage growth : even controlling for entry wage level, w H or w L , employed workers are still heterogeneous in terms of job seniority.
On the contrary, when unemployed workers are only willing to accept high-wage job offers, the labor market equilibrium exhibits higher unemployment and lower worker mobility : unemployment duration is higher and there is no direct interfirm worker mobility. This case also exhibits a lesser degree of cross-section wage dispersion : there is now a single entry wage level and wage heterogeneity only arises from heterogeneity in job seniority.
Sources of wage losses
In this model, workers exogenously separated from their current employer after two periods in employment will, on average, experience wage losses upon re-employment. The first one relates to on-the-job wage growth : workers who stayed with the same firm for two periods lose the firm-specific additional earnings potential g that they had accumulated as they increased their seniority with their pre-displacement employer. We will further refer to this source of wage losses as A-losses.
The second source of wage adjustment arises from on-the-job search. Workers exiting unemployment into a low-wage firm have a chance to subsequently move to a high-wage firm. Hence, at the time when displacement occurs, displaced workers have a greater probability of being employed in a high-wage firm than new-or re-entrants to the employment pool or average employed workers. This higher probability of being in a high-wage firm represents the benefits derived from extended job search and will be lost upon job displacement. We will further refer to this source of wage losses as a S -losses.
In order to clarify the distinction introduced here, it is worth emphasizing that in both cases, wage losses originate from the existence of some components of earnings that cannot be transferred from the pre-to the post-displacement job. What really distinguishes A-losses from S -losses is the specific aspect of labor market dynamics that has lead to the emergence of these non-transferable earnings components.
In the case of A-losses, post-displacement wage losses reflect non-transferable earnings components that were accumulated with seniority on the pre-displacement job.
Hence, A-losses solely rely on the intra-firm dynamics of wages and seniority. On the contrary S-losses reflect non-transferable earnings components acquired through extended on-the-job search and inter-firm worker mobility. Hence, S -losses result from the external labor market dynamics of job prospection.
This can be illustrated by comparing the two possible equilibria of our simple model which exhibit different mixes of A-losses and S -losses. Under job search strategy I, there are no gains from on-the-job search and workers stay with the same employer for two periods. The only source of wage adjustment is A-losses that amounts to g. Under strategy II, a fraction λ 1 (1 − p) of displaced workers will have moved from a low-wage match to a high-wage match at the time of displacement.
These workers will not have accumulated any firm-specific earnings potential g at the time of displacement and will only incur S -losses. The rest of displaced workers will incur A-losses. In this second case, average S-losses amount to
Decomposing observed wage losses along these lines, as will be done in the rest of this paper, can first provide an empirical assessment of the different factors contribution to individual wage dynamics. Furthermore, this decomposition can also be useful in addressing several analytical and policy-related issues regarding the consequences of worker displacement. One first major concern, underlying most analysis, is that worker displacement may induce severe efficiency losses arising from the destruction of specific human capital. Absent any measurable concept of specific human capital, this notion is often proxied, in empirical work, by job tenure within a given firm, which in turn suggests to assimilate efficiency losses with A-losses.
From a theoretical perspective, this interpretation appears far from granted. First, A-losses may not necessarily correspond to a loss of specific human capital, since upward sloping wage-seniority profiles can also arise from compensation deferral, as in Lazear (1979) , absent any form specific human capital investment. Secondly, part of S -losses may reflect efficiency losses as well. This will be the case if interfirm wage heterogeneity reflects heterogeneity in match productivity, as in Jovanovic (1979) . Under this interpretation, job search appears as a productive activity and S -losses will incorporate match-efficiency losses. This suggests two major caveats in the analysis of efficiency losses : first, efficiency losses may go beyond accumulated firm-specific human capital, and, second, they cannot unambiguously be measured absent complementary information on individual productivity, usually not available in survey data.
Beside efficiency losses, wage losses of displaced workers can also be analyzed in terms of social fairness. In this matter, the A-S distinction yields stronger prescriptions. A-losses appear unambiguously unfair, regardless of the ultimate determinants of a positive wage-seniority relationship, be it the acceptance of initial underpayment or the costly investment in specific human capital. On the contrary, unless access to better matches can be ascribed to inter-individual differences in job search effort (as opposed to luck), S-losses may appear less unjust and can be seen, from the worker's perspective, as the re-distribution of job-search rents.
Finally, distinguishing these two sources of wage adjustments can be informative for the design of public policies aimed at alleviating the individual cost of worker displacement. If wage adjustments mostly arise from S-losses than job-search assistance policies may be more successful in attenuating post-displacement wage losses.
On the contrary, if A-losses are the driving force, training policy would appear more adequate.
Discussion of previous research
Several papers have previously analyzed the determinants of wage losses induced by worker displacement, essentially for the United-Stated. Among the list of likely suspects considered in empirical work are "the development of nontransferable human capital in a job, unionization, good job matches, efficiency wages, internal labor markets and incentive pay mechanisms" (Kletzer, 1998) . These different explanations can be straightforwardly linked to the distinction between A-losses ("devel-opment of nontransferable human capital", "internal labor markets and incentive pay mechanisms") and S-losses ("unionization, good job matches, efficiency wages") considered here. However, despite extensive descriptive evidence, there still remains considerable uncertainty on the empirical contribution of each of these different explanations.
Many studies, including, among others, Farber (1993) , Ruhm (1987 ), Kletzer (1989 and Kuhn and Sweetman (1998) , have focused on the impact of job seniority on post-displacement outcomes and have established that wage losses rise with predisplacement tenure.
5 This result has usually been interpreted as evidence of "the importance of specialized human capital that accumulated with time" (Topel, 1990) .
It also lies at the heart of Hamermesh (1987) 's estimation of the social losses implied by job displacement. There are, however, two challenges to this interpretation. First, as already mentioned, positive returns to firm seniority may arise from other factors than specific human capital accumulation. Secondly, as emphasized in Abraham and Farber (1987) , Altonji and Shakotko (1987) , and a later paper by Topel (1991) , pre-displacement job seniority may be endogenous and positively related to match quality. Consequently, the estimated relationship between seniority and wage losses of displaced workers can neither identify the extent of specific human capital losses nor the contribution of seniority accumulated firm-specific earnings potential, i.e.
A-losses.
Other papers have also stressed that displaced workers changing industry upon re-employed usually experience larger wage losses (Swaim and Podgursky, 1987; Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan, 1993b) . Furthermore, it has also been shown that wage losses rise more with pre-displacement seniority for industry changers than for industry stayers (Neal, 1995) . This has often been interpreted as evidence that, to some extent, specific human capital accumulated in a given firm may be partially transferred to other firms in the same industry. Consequently, the measurement of A-losses should incorporate this additional dimension of accumulated earnings potential specificity. However, as noted in Kletzer (1996) this portability of specific human capital across firms within a given sector seems limited to a narrow number of industries. Furthermore, larger wage losses for more senior industry switchers may also arise from industry specific labor market rents (Krueger and Summers, 1988) . The contribution of pre-displacement rents, is also confirmed by evidence that workers displaced from larger firms and/or unionized jobs usually experience larger wage losses (Carrington and Zaman, 1994; Krashinsky, forthcoming) .
Lastly, different papers concerned with high-unemployment European countries have also suggested that wage losses of displaced workers may be used to infer the level of individual reservation wages, as they reflect post-displacement job search strategy.
6 The preceding theoretical model indicates, that while unemployment search strategy clearly influences post-displacement outcomes, it is by no means the sole determinant of wage losses. On the one hand, A-losses appears only determined by job duration and returns to seniority. On the other hand, lower reservation wages clearly lead to higher S-losses, as they will increase the prospects for subsequent profitable inter-firm mobility. Unfortunately, S-losses also depend on the rate of arrival of alternative job offers. Hence, low S-losses cannot be unambiguously ascribed to high unemployed workers reservation wages.
3 Econometric models and data description 3.1 Econometric specifications
Wage losses
From a descriptive perspective, the effect of job displacement on individual earnings can be empirically analyzed using the following augmented Mincerian earnings model borrowed from Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (JLS) (1993a) :
where, w i,t denotes the logarithm of individual i at time t; X i,t is a vector of observable individual characteristics; D i,t is a dummy variable equal to one if individual i was displaced at some point before time t ; α i is an individual fixed effect; γ t represents a time-varying effect common to all workers; ε i,t is a mean zero iid error term. In this equation, the effect of worker displacement on subsequent earnings is summarized by the coefficient δ.
Different strategies have been previously implemented to estimate δ. The simplest one consists in a cross-section estimation of equation 1 on a sample of displaced and non-displaced workers. In the presence of individual fixed effects, this will yield an inconsistent estimator of δ if, on average, displaced workers have different unmeasured characteristics α i . Using the difference between pre-and post-displacement wages of displaced workers to identify δ, as often done in studies based on the CPS Displaced Worker Survey, eliminates individual heterogeneity bias but at the cost other possible inconsistencies, since it will confound changes in X it and γ t with the effect of worker displacement.
In this paper, I use a "difference-in-difference" estimation of equation 1 to measure the effect of worker displacement on wages, δ. This amounts to estimate the following model :
where D i,t will be equal to one for workers displaced between time t − τ and t.
Equation 2 is estimated on a sample composed displaced and non-displaced workers.
The latter reference group allows to identify both (X i,t − X i,t−τ )β and (γ t − γ t−τ ).
Following JLS, we restrict the reference group of non-displaced workers to individuals who stayed with the same firm between t − τ and t.
Since most observed individual determinants of earnings (e.g. education, marital status, region of residence) will be constant between t−τ and t, X i,t −X i,t−τ will only capture the impact of changes in labor market experience. For all observations, this will be fixed and equal to τ given that only potential experience is measured in my
data. Yet, in order to account for non-linearities and heterogeneity in experiencewage profiles, estimation of equation 2 will incorporate individual experience at date t − τ and level of education, as control variables for X i,t − X i,t−τ . Estimation of 2 will also include state-dummies in order to account for regional differences in overall wage growth γ t − γ t−τ .
Determinants of wage losses
The decomposition discussed in the previous section can be incorporated to the empirical analysis by modelling the contribution of worker seniority and match heterogeneity to individual earnings. To do so, consider the following model 7 :
where S i,t denotes firm-seniority and φ i,t represents a fixed-effect specific to the firm or match of individual i at date t. 8 For non-displaced workers, the change in log wage between t − τ and t will be given by :
Consequently, the effect of displacement on wages in equation will be equal to :
The two expectations in equation 5 respectively capture the contribution of losses of seniority accumulated firm-specific earnings potential (A-losses) and changes in average match or firm quality (S-losses) to wage losses of displaced workers.
Again, adding an interaction term of the form D i,t × S i,t−τ in equation 2 will not allow to measure the contribution of A-losses since φ i,t−τ will also be correlated with S i,t−τ . However, the contribution of S-losses can be identified, provided that a consistent estimate of ψ can be estimated. If so, we can define and compute ω i,t the value of individual wages, net of returns to firm seniority, as ω i,t = w i,t − S i,t ψ. In this case, one can estimate a variant of equation 2 using ω i,t − ω i,t−τ as a dependant
variable. This will produce an estimate of δ whose expectation will be equal to
, that is S-losses.
Data
The comparative analysis is based on a panel extracted from the French Employment surveys (enquêtes Emploi, henceforth FES) and on the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
French data
The FES is a labor force survey conducted each year by the Among the different reasons for unemployment, the questionnaire distinguishes between voluntary quits, end of seasonal and fixed-duration contract, individuals previously out of the labor force, workers on "collective" permanent layoff (licenciement collectif ) and workers on "individual" permanent layoff (licenciement individuel ). The distinction between individual and collective layoff, in these data, is based on the number of people being laid-off from a single firm at a given date :
collective (respectively individual) layoffs correspond to situations where more (respectively less) than 10 workers at a time where terminated from the same firm.
This distinction only partially matches the definition of worker displacement, as displaced workers are usually defined as workers losing their job for reasons independent of their individual performance or behavior. While workers on "collective" layoffs would certainly fit this definition, the situation of people on "individual" layoffs is more ambiguous and could correspond both to workers displaced from smaller firms or workers fired for poor work performance of behavior. In order to distinguish these two groups, I control, in the estimation, for two separate job displacement dummies : Mass layoff will be equal to one for individuals being unemployed and reporting a collective layoff; the second one Other layoff / Fired will be equal to one for unemployed workers on "individual " layoff.
This paper uses data from the 1990 through 1997 FES. Since each household in the sample is interviewed yearly during three consecutive years and since one third of the sample is renewed each year, I can construct five three-year individual panels of labor market history. The final data set used in the estimations for France pools these five short panels. 9 Given that displacement status is only observed for those being unemployed in a least one wave, and that estimation of equation 2 requires both a pre-and a post-displacement wage observations, displaced workers used in the estimation of wage losses will be consist individuals employed at date t − 2, who lost their job between t − 2 and t − 1 and who were re-employed at date t, where t denotes the last period of the three-year panel. Consequently, w i,t − w i,t−τ will refer to two-year changes in log individual wages. The control group consists in individuals who stayed with the same firm between t − 2 and t.
US data
The US data are taken from the 1983 through 1992 waves of the PSID. It provides information on worker and job characteristics very similar to the one collected in the FES, together with a wealth of data on individual and household income. 10 Earnings data used in this paper refer to hourly and weekly wage earned from the main job held as of the survey date.
Assessing worker displacement status in the PSID exposes to ambiguities that are similar to those encountered with the FES. Among involuntary separations, the PSID distinguishes between two reasons for job termination. The first one corresponds to workers who lost their job because "their company folded, changed hands, moved out of town, their employer died or went out of business". We define a Mass layoff dummy equal to one for individuals in this group. The second reason for termination corresponds to workers who were "laid off or fired ". Again, this 9 Consequently, estimations include additional control for time dummies. 10 As already noted in the literature, original self-reported tenure data exhibit many inconsistencies in the PSID. In numerous cases, year-to-year tenure variation for individuals staying on the same job fail to equal one. In such cases, job tenure data was recoded as in Topel (1991) .
group is likely to include workers being terminated for reasons related to individual characteristics. We define an Other layoff / Fired dummy variable equal to one for workers in this category who do not return to their previous employer and zero otherwise. In order to insure comparability with our French sample of displaced workers, we further restrict our sample of displaced US workers to individuals who experienced some spell of unemployment.
11
As for our French sample, estimation of equation 2 uses two-year changes in log individual wages. Since our PSID data cover the period 1983-1992, each individual in the sample contributes multiple wage changes observations to the estimation. For each year t ∈ [1985, 1992] , we assign individual-year observations to the displacement groups if individuals report the occurrence of a job displacement, as defined above, between t and t − 2.
12 The control group consists of individuals who stayed at the same firm between t and t − 2.
Samples restrictions and description
I restrict my final samples to male heads of household aged 25 to 55 years old in t−2 and exclude self employed workers from the analysis. Imposing these restrictions gives a sample of 3100 individuals and a total of about 12625 observations in the PSID data and a sample of 21990 individuals and observations in the FES panel .
The main characteristics of each sample are given in table 2. The number of ob-11 Not imposing the additional restriction that displaced workers experience subsequent unemployment has the following effects on estimated wage losses. For individuals in the Mass layoff group, estimated wage losses are about .03 log points lower (in absolute value), but the difference is only significant for highly educated workers. For individuals in the Other layoff / Fired group, if decreases estimated wage losses by .01 log points but the difference in estimates is not significant.
12 Restricting the displacement sample to individuals dismissed between t − 1 and t − 2 would more closely match the definition of the French displacement sample, but would strongly reduce the size of the sample, without significant effect on estimated job losses.
servations with a worker displacement episode amounts to 4.49% of all observations in the US sample and 4.9% in the French sample. In the US, almost all workers defined as displaced are re-employed at date t, against only 20% of French displaced workers. In both countries displaced workers experience nominal wage losses, around -.07 log points in France and -0.4 log points in the US, while job stayers experience significant nominal wage gains, around .06 log points in France and .10 in the US.
Compared to the sample of job stayers, displaced workers in both countries, tend to be younger and have less firm seniority at date t − 2. For both countries, I define a three levels educational classification. In the US, low education corresponds to high-school dropouts; medium education to high school graduates; high education to levels of education higher than high school. The classification for France takes into account the lower average educational attainment of the French work force : medium education includes individuals with a vocational degree lower than high school and individuals with upper secondary education who did not complete high school; high education includes high-school graduates (baccalauréat) and above; low education corresponds to individuals with less than an intermediate vocational degree. On average, in both countries, displaced workers tend to have lower education than the control group of job stayers. Estimates based on PSID data (column 2 and 10) corroborate results from other studies of job displacement in the US.
Wage losses in France and the United-States

Basic results
13 On average displaced workers experience a .15 log points fall in weekly wages relative to the control group of job stayers (column 2). This fall in wages appears primarily driven by a change in earned hourly wage : column 10 indicates that earnings per hours fall by about .13 log points. The discrepancy between estimates based on weekly and hourly wages also suggests that change in hours of work might partially account for the fall in weekly earnings, a fact that is consistent with the finding mentioned in Farber (1993) that a significant fraction of pre-displacement full-time workers return to a part-time job. Finally, wage losses appear very similar for the two groups of displaced workers.
In France, displaced workers also experience significant wage losses. Relative to job stayers, French workers displaced in a mass layoff suffer a .12 log points fall in weekly wage and a .09 log points fall in hourly wage rate. Workers laid-off in other circumstances or fired experience slightly larger wage losses : weekly wage losses amount to .15 log points and hourly wage losses to .13 log points. These higher wage losses for workers in this group are consistent with the fact that part of these workers may have been dismissed for reasons related to individual performance or behavior. For these workers job displacement might signal lower intrinsic productivity, which may in turn induce larger wage losses, as suggested in Gibbons and Katz (1991) . Comparison of hourly and weekly wage losses indicates that in France, job displacement also induces a change in hours worked. Lastly, comparison of post-displacement wage adjustments in the two countries reveals slightly higher 13 See for instance Kletzer (1998) for a survey and Ruhm (1991) for other estimates of wage losses of displaced workers based on PSID data.
wage losses, on average, in the US. Yet, it should be emphasized that estimated wage losses of displaced workers do not differ markedly in the two countries. Hence, the consequences of worker displacement on individual welfare does not appear particularly milder in France, which stands at odd with the common view of a "rigid" French labor market. 
Results by level of education
The general picture above still holds when we split the total sample by level of education, according to the classification described in section 3.2. For workers with a medium level of education, wage losses appear higher in the US than in France. The fall in weekly wage amounts to .17 and .15 log points for US workers displaced, respectively, in a mass layoff and in other form of layoff or fired. For France, similar figures are .13 and .9 log points, which suggests, again, that wage losses are only slightly lower in France. Comparing the relative fall in hourly wage rate reveals a more divergent pattern of wage adjustments : in France, it amounts to .11 log points for workers in the Mass Layoff group and .07 for those in the Other layoff / Fired group; in the US, comparable groups suffer a .14 and .15 log points fall in hourly wage rates. Hence for workers with an intermediate level of education, the adjustment in hourly wage rate following displacement appears larger in the US.
14 Due to right censoring, part of our samples of displaced workers did not return to employment by the end of our observation period. Indeed censoring appears more frequently on our French sample. This may induce sample selection bias in our estimates of wage losses of displaced workers. Estimation of a two step Heckman model of reemployment and wages on our French sample does not indicate any significant selection effect. This confirms previous results that have cast doubt on the importance of selection bias in estimates of the wage losses of displaced workers (see Swaim and Pogdursky (1987) and Houle and Van Audenrode (1995) ).
These differences in wage adjustments in the two countries appear more pronounced for individuals with a low level of education. In the US, low education workers displaced in a Mass layoff experience a larger fall in weekly wage (.23 log points) than workers with an intermediate level of education; and a comparable fall in hourly wage rates (.14 log points). On the contrary, in France, low education workers displaced in a mass layoff suffer wage losses smaller than French workers with an intermediate level of education. Furthermore, wage losses of low education individuals in the Mass layoff group amount to only half of the estimated wage losses for similar US workers, both for hourly (-.07 log points) and weekly wage adjustments (-.10 log points). While several factors may explain smaller wage adjustments in France than in the US, this specificity of wage adjustment at the bottom end of the skill distribution might possibly be accounted for by the existence of a binding minimum wage, a point we will return to in section 5. However, comparison of workers in the Other layoff / Fired group in the two countries yields less clear cut conclusions : workers in this group seem to experience similar weekly wage adjustments in the two countries.
Lastly, comparison of post-displacement wage adjustments for displaced workers with a high level of education does not indicate any significant differences between France and the US. For both countries, estimates in columns 3-4 indicate similar wage losses for each displacement group across the two countries. On the other hand, the two displacement groups seem to experience, in both countries, very different patterns of post-displacement wage adjustments. While these results might be interpreted as evidence that non-mass layoff is more stigmatizing for highly skilled individuals, one may also suspect that the distinction between these two causes of separation might also appear less relevant for this education group. Furthermore one should also emphasize that wage losses are not precisely estimate for this education group.
Overall, several important features emerge from this comparison by level of education. Firstly, there does not seem to be any clear and systematic differences in wage adjustments in the two countries, at the higher end of the skill distribution.
On the contrary, the wage losses seem to be lower in France than the US for the low and intermediate levels of education. This seems particularly true for workers at the bottom of the skill distribution and for hourly wage rate adjustments.
Wage losses and pre-displacement seniority
Finally, table 4 provides descriptive evidence on the impact of pre-displacement seniority on post-displacement wage adjustments. All estimates are based on equation 2 where the displacement dummy has been interacted with seniority on the job lost.
For workers displaced in a mass layoff, higher seniority is significantly associated with higher wage losses consecutive to job displacement. In both countries, one additional year of seniority increases losses in weekly wage by .015 log points. For hourly wage rate, similar figures amount to .009 log points in France and .013 in the US. The above-mentioned difference in average wage losses between the two countries now appears in the fact that total wage losses for workers with low level of seniority is smaller in France than in the US : estimates in table 4 indicate that workers with zero pre-displacement suffer a .03 log points wage fall in France against .06 in the US.
For workers displaced in circumstances other than a mass layoff, pre-displacement seniority does not affect post-displacement wage losses. This may be explained by the fact that this latter group includes both workers who have been laid-off and worker who have been fired for cause. If dismissal for poor individual performance or behavior is more likely at the earliest stage of a worker career within a firm, then, among individuals in the Other layoff / Fired group, the proportion of individuals who have been fired for cause will be higher at low seniority levels. Furthermore one would expect post-displacement wage adjustments to be higher for individuals who have been fired for cause , irrespective of predisplacement seniority. On the contrary, among workers being terminated for exogenous reasons, one would expect higher wage losses for more senior workers. These two effect might then cancel out in the heterogeneous group of workers fired and displaced in a non-mass layoff, if the proportion of each sub-category varies with pre-displacement seniority.
Determinants of observed wage losses
We now turn to the economic determinants of observed wage adjustments following job displacement. As already discussed, given a consistent estimate of returns to seniority in each country, it is possible to decompose observed wage losses of displaced workers into seniority accumulated earnings potential, A-losses, and firm or match specific earnings components, S-losses. In the rest of the paper I estimate of the effect of job seniority on individual wage and apply the decomposition suggested in section 3.1.2.
Returns to seniority
There has been an important debate surrounding the estimation of within-firm wage dynamics and the effect of seniority on wages.
15 As pointed out by several authors, the major estimation problem stems from the possible endogeneity of seniority with respect to wages in the presence of heterogeneous workers and/or firms. In order to solve this endogeneity issue, we estimate returns to seniority using Topel (1991)'s estimation procedure.
Results are presented in table 5. The effect of experience and seniority on wage dynamics appears very close in the two countries. Early on the job, one additional year of seniority rises hourly wage rate by .017 log points in both cases. The marginal effect of seniority on earnings decreases with time on the job. Concavity of wageseniority profiles appears slightly more pronounced in the US than in France : for instance, 10 years of seniority appear to increase wages by .14 log points in France against .11 log points in the US. Regarding the effect of general experience on earnings, one should note that while the effect of the linear term in experience appears larger in France this is compensated by a more concave profile. Overall the estimated effect of experience also seems very similar in the two economies : 20 years of experience appear to increase wages by .22 log points in France against .20 log points in the US.
These results should be compared to estimates found in previous research. The estimated effect of seniority found here differ from results reported in Topel's article.
As can be seen by comparing columns 2 to 4 of table 6 this discrepancy mostly results from the fact that Topel's estimates make use of a wage variable computed from yearly reports of earnings and hours worked. As demonstrated in Altonji and Williams (1997) and Lefranc (forthcoming) , the existence of important measurement error in this variable leads such estimates to overemphasize the effect of seniority on earnings.agrees. On the other hand, results found here agree with estimates reported in several recent papers. In particular, the effect of seniority on earnings predicted from estimates of table 5 corroborate those presented in Altonji and Williams (1997) .
They are also consistent with estimates based on administrative firm level data, e.g. Abowd et al. (1999) for France and Bronars and Famulary (1997) for the UnitedStates.
A-losses or S-losses ?
Estimates of the returns to seniority obtained in the previous section now enable us to examine the structural determinants underlying the gross wage losses examined in the previous section. Table 6 presents estimates of the effect of job displacement on hourly wage rate net of the effect of accumulated firm seniority, for France and the US. As already explained, this corresponds to the extent of S-losses. Estimates for the total sample are given in columns (1) and (2). Comparison of these two columns reveals different patterns of wage adjustment in the two countries for workers displaced in a mass layoff. In France, residual wage losses, i.e. change in the wage rate net of accumulated returns to seniority, amount to only about .03 log points. On the contrary, US workers displaced under similar circumstances experience larger Slosses, around .08 log points. Compared to results presented in table 3 this indicates that in France, two third of observed adjustments in hourly wage rates are driven by A-losses and only one third is explained by S-losses; in the US, the relative contribution of the two sources of wage adjustments are reversed, with S-losses explaining between one half to two thirds of total wage losses.
Comparison of average residual wage losses for workers for the Other layoff / Fired group apparently suggests that this difference between the two countries no longer holds for individuals in this group. Here, the extent of S-losses amount to about .09 log points in both countries. However, separate estimates by level of education suggest that this result is entirely driven by the higher education group.
On the contrary, comparison of wage adjustments in the medium and low education groups confirms the small contribution of S-losses to post-displacement wage adjustments in France, relative to the US. For the intermediate education group, the extent of S-losses in France amounts to .046 log point for workers in the Mass layoff group and a non-significant .034 in the Other layoff / Fired group. For the US, S-losses appear more than twice as large, amounting to .09 log points for the first group and .11 for the second group. The discrepancy between the two countries in the extent of S-losses appears even more pronounced in the low education group :
for this category, in France, none of the two groups of displaced workers experience statistically significant S-losses while for their US counterpart S-losses amount to .08 log points and .04 log points for the Mass layoff and Other layoff / Fired groups respectively. For these two groups, this represents, again, between two-thirds and one half of total wage adjustments.
These results clearly indicate that despite fairly similar gross wage losses, the labor market dynamics underlying the consequences of worker displacement differ markedly between the two countries. In France, the change in log hourly wage after displacement appears primarily driven by the loss of returns to seniority accumulated on the pre-displacement job. In the US, forgone firm seniority also appears to triggers significant wage adjustments, around .054 log points.
16 But the major difference appears in the fact that in the US, on average, displaced workers experience further wage losses due to the downgrading into job matches whose quality is lower than the pre-displacement one. This finding confirms previous results by, amongst others, Topel and Ward (1992) that have underlined the importance of job prospection in career dynamics of US workers. On the contrary, in France, this downgrading into lower quality matches appears very moderate. This shows firstly that French displaced workers do not fall into markedly intrinsically worse jobs and secondly that career dynamics in France are essentially driven by intra-firm wage growth and not by labor market job prospection.
Ultimately, this lack of S-losses in the French labor market may arise from several features of the French labor market. In fact, on-the-job search will allow to access better paying jobs under two conditions : first the existence of significant gains from job mobility, with relates to existence of significant interfirm wage differentials, and second the existence of opportunities of a profitable job mobility. Hence the moderate extent of S-losses may either result from a more compressed distribution of offered wages or from slack labor demand and the lack of alternative job offers. A comparison of wage losses for low and medium skilled workers may help explain the absence of on-the-job search gains in France. Columns 8 and 10 indicate that in the US, the extent of downgrading into lower paying jobs is quantitatively similar for low and medium skill individuals. While both groups share most of the specificities of the French labor market (job protection, unemployment insurance, wage bargaining) they are likely to be differently affected by the existence of a high minimum wage, relative to the US level. Hence the absence of wage losses beyond the loss of seniority for low-skilled individuals may be the outcome of a binding minimum wage that constraints wage dynamics by reducing both the scope of profitable job mobility and the intensity of labor demand and alternative job offers for that skill group.
Conclusions
Contrary to the common view of a sclerotic French labor market, where wage adjustments mechanisms would be hindered by several institutional features, estimates obtained in this paper, first indicate that job losses, in France, does indeed lead to sizeable wage losses for displaced workers. In fact, while the order of magnitude of these wage losses appears lower than in the US, overall welfare losses could reveal higher in France, if one were to take into account the higher duration of unemployment of displaced workers in France.
Yet, if welfare losses appear comparable in the two countries, my findings also reveal that the determinants of observed outcomes markedly differ. Losing one's job, on the French labor market, primarily leads to the loss of firm-specific earnings potential accumulated prior to job displacement. This indicates that individual careers of displaced workers in France are essentially driven by intra-firm dynamics.
In opposite, losing one's job on the US labor market also erodes the benefits of extended job search and bring workers down in the distribution of job offers. While intra-firm wage dynamics do play a role in individual careers, external labor market dynamics and the accumulation of search rents through job prospection strongly contribute to wage growth of displaced workers, a phenomena that is hardly present in French labor dynamics.
Our results also provide useful indications on the factors responsible for these differences in labor market dynamics in the two countries. While the forces governing wage losses of displaced workers on the US labor market appear similar across skill groups, our disaggregated analysis indicates that wage losses of displaced workers in
France are markedly lower for low education workers. Furthermore, the absence of S-losses seems particularly pronounced in that skill groups, a specific feature that could stem from the existence of binding minimum wage.
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